In Sect. 2, we consider a society whose each other's preferences. We prove, und the society can be represented by a deci incomplete information) has a Bayesian ther show that the decision scheme may that we may restrict ourselves to dichot At ( E , Rn), every alternative is dominated but not uniformly dominated. Hence,
Given a preference profile RN = (Z?1 , . . . , Rn) and a coalition 5 ç AT, we denote by = (/?5, /^'5) the preference profile in which Ql -Rl for i e S and R* = I for i € N ' 5, where I is the total indifference relation on A, that is xly for all je, y e A.
Remark 3 For any RN and for any SçiV,we have Cuf(RN ) ç Cuf(Rs , /^).
Indeed, since uniform domination is defined via strict preference, replacing a strict preference of a player by indifference reduces (weakly) uniform dominance and hence increases (weakly) the uniform core.
As stated in the following theorem, for a monotone and superadditive effectivity function, the uniform core is always nonempty.
Theorem 1 (Abdou and Keiding 1991) . Let E be a monotonie and superadditive E F and let RN e WN. Then the uniform core Cuf(E , RN ) is nonempty .
Corollary 1 For any monotonie and superadditive effectivity function E, the uniform core Cuf(E , •) : WN -> Po(A) is a social choice correspondence.
The following result is strongly used in this paper.
Theorem 2 (Keiding and Peleg 2006; Peleg and Peters 2010 Vetoing sincerely amounts to presenting the following dichotomous preferences (see Sect. 2.5 for the notation):
The pro Inequalities (1) imply that the pure strategy vector (/,...,/) is a Nash equili in the game /¿. Indeed, for any deviation Rl e W of player /, «'(*)</(*; = ^u'(x)^q (s) An information structure (IS) is a 2n-tuple J = (Tl , . . . , Tn ; pl , . . . , /?") where for each i € N , 71 is the (finite) set of types of player i , and pl is a probability distribution on 7 = XízmT1 such that pl (tl = tl0) > 0 for all tl0 e Tl . This is the prior distribution of player i on the set of types 7' which induces the conditional probability distribution pl(t~l'tl) on T~l = Xj^iT-l (the beliefs of player i of type tl on the types of the other players). In a Harsanyi-consistent information structure there is a common prior namely, pl = p , for all i e N.
We now modify the notion of decision scheme so as to adapt it to the context of incomplete information.
Definition 4 1. A generalized decision scheme (GDS) is a function d : WN x7-> AW-2. A strategy of play er i (with respect to a GDS) is a pair (sl,7tl) where sl :Tl -> W (denote by S' the set of all such mappings, let 5 = 51 x-•x5n)and7ri : Tl -> T'. Equivalently, a strategy of player i is a mapping sl : Tl -» W x Tl . Denote by Š1 the set of pure strategies of player i and by 5 = S1 x • • • x Sn the set of vectors of pure strategies. A vector s e Š will also be written as s = (s, n) where s = (s1, . . . , sn) e S and ti = (jr 1 , . . . , nn).
The idea behind this definition is that in a situation of incomplete information, each player is asked to input to the (generalized) decision scheme, both his preferences and his type. As a result, the (Bayes Nash) equilibrium of the induced game will exhibit the 'spirit' of the revelation principle , as each player will input his true type.
Any generalized decision scheme (GDS) induces an effectivity functions in a similar way that a DS does. 
Note that in this game, the strategy sets are Sl rather than Š1 since d'(RN , t) does not depend on t. This is a finite game with complete information, so it has a correlated equilibrium (CE). Let (q(s))s€s be a CE of the game Gdv then the equilibrium condition is: Inserting this 8l in (9) all terms with ? ^ tl will be the same on both sides of the inequality and will cancel, dividing the remaining term by pl(tl) (which is positive) we obtain that: £<7(S)t4(S|íť) > (s-', /ř'V) (10) -8i(si)(ti) = si(P), WeS¿.
-¿VX?') = ^ t' for all sl e S' Inserting this 8' in (9), all terms with P j=. tl will be the same on both sides of the inequality and will cancel, dividing the remaining term by pl(tl) (which is positive) we obtain that: ^qisW^slÒ > I/') (11) Case (i). Substituting s = (IN, t) in the left-hand side of (4) and d from (12) 
Monotonie decision schemes
Monotonicity is an intuitive and desirable property of a decision scheme representing a certain EF. It roughly says that if the position of an alternative is improved in the preferences of the members the society, its probability of being chosen by the decision scheme should increase. This requirement may be too strong when the alternative is ranked very low in the members' preferences so that its probability of being chosen is zero and it is likely to remain zero even if one member improves its ranking in his preference. To express this formally, we first introduce the following term and notation:
Let Rn e WN and let x e A be any alternative. A preference profile ŘN e WN is said to be obtained from RN by an improvement of the position ofx if: We address now a natural question regarding the proof of our main theorem: Was it indeed necessary to use a generalized decision scheme in order to obtain our representation result rather than a decision scheme that was sufficient for the representation in the complete information case? More precisely, can Theorem 4 be proved with DS 1 The Borda count is originally defined for strict orderings, however, it can be extended to weak preference orderings as follows: Given R e W and x € A, the Borda count of x is the average of the Borda counts of the elements of its equivalence class (in R) in a strict preference ordering Q on A that preserves the strict preferences in R, that is if x is strictly preferred to y according to R then jc Qy (it is easily verified that this is well defined that is, it is the same for any such Q ). In the sequel, we shall refer to these properties of ul as (i), (ii) etc. Assume now, contrary to our claim that there exists a representation of E by a monotonie decision scheme d such that the game rId = (N; W , W; T1, T 2, p' u' w2; d) has a pure strategy BNE, say s = (s1, s2). This implies (using the uniform common prior) the following inequalities: j1^), j2(ř|)) > t',tļ)d(a, R,s2(t2))y (16) for k = 1, . . . , 6 and R e W ' [s1^)}-Using property (iii), this implies: Zj=luHa, tļ, tj) [d(fi, R, s2(t for all R and Q in IV. By (15) aeA Continuing our discussion of Example 2, we consider now the well-known Bord rule. This is an SCC in which the states in A are ranked by each player, in our case (best), 1 (middle) or 0 (worst), and the chosen states are those with the maximal tot score. For the profile of preferences in our example, each state scores 3 and henc all states are chosen according to the Borda rule. This is a representation of E (th simple majority rule) since no player is effective for any proper subset of {x, y, z] a any two players can force any state, say x by submitting the preferences (x, y, z) an (jc, z, y) (thus guaranteeing a score of at least 4 for x and at most 3 for each of y a z). To see that, let A ' CU/(RN) = {jci , . . . , jc*}. By Abdou and Keiding (1991, p. It follows readily from the definition that e and that C"/(£, RN) = Cuf(E, RN) = H(R"). Using Lemma 1, we can repeat the proof of Theorem 4 to the ga players are restricted to dichotomous preference relations that is, r to obtain: Theorem 7 Let E : P(N) -> P(Po(A)) be a monotonie and su Let J = (r1, . . . , Tn' plt . . . , pn) be an IS, and let (w1, . . . , utilities for the players. Then E has a representation by a generaliz d : X T A(A) such that the game r¿ = (N; , Ws ; ( ul)i£u' d) has a BNE in pure strategies in which each player reports his true type .
Example 1 continued
Omitting the singleton type set of player 2 (and the trivial beliefs of player 1 on this type set), our information structure is J = (Tl, p2) where Tl = {1«,, 1¿} and p2(lw) = p2(lb) = 1/2. We now define the utility functions of the agents: -ul( ww , lu;) = 2, u 1 (bb, lw) = 1 and ul(bw , 1^) = ul(wb , I«;) = 0 (1", likes 'conformity' with preference to white shirts).
-ul(ww , lb) = 1, ul(bb , lb) = 2 and ul(bw , U) = U) = 0 (U likes 'conformity' with preference to blue shirts).
-u2(a , 1 u; ) = -ul(at lw) and w2(a, lb) = U) for all a G A (the utility of player 2 is 'opposed' to that of player 1 whatever his type is).
Consider the Bayesian game in which the players submit dichotomous preferences: = (N; W&, W$; J', ux,u2' duf). As a game in strategic form, this is a game in which player 2 has 15 pure strategies (indexed by the nonempty subsets of A) and player 1 has 152 pure strategies. In order to find a BNE, and hence a CE of this game, we focus on the following submatrix of /$ described in Fig. 1 which we shall refer to as the 'restricted game.'
Here, the pure strategies are denoted by the upper-set in the dichotomous preference that is: ( w w , wb) == wy^bb etc* Note that since player 1 is effective for the set { ww , wb }, simply by wearing a white shirt, playing the pure strategy ( ww , wb)
guarantees an outcome in { ww , wb}. Therefore, this strategy can be abbreviated as w (wearing a white shirt). Similarly for the other strategies in the reduced game. Thus,
